Currency Appreciation and "Deindustrialization": A European Perspective
The rise in the value of the U.S. dollar in the early 1980's and its subsequent fall were surrounded by arguments that a currency appreciation depresses a country's industrial and traded goods sectors and that a depreciation would boost these sectors.
In the U.S. case, the argument was made that the 1980-85 appreciation of the dollar "deindustrialized" the country, or that America lost its international competitiveness. The antidote, according to this argument, was to engineer a decline in the dollar to boost U.S. competitiveness.
t The international counterpart to this argument was that foreign nations, including
Europe, gained competitiveness in the early 1980's, only to lose it after 1985
when their currencies appreciated.
This article examines the arguments surrounding this view and some evidence on whether there is such an inverse link between a country's exchange rate and its international competitiveness. It first reviews an alternative hypothesis that movements in the value of a country's currency, to the contrary, reflect a positive relationship to the country's competitiveness. Earlier discussions of this hypothesis have focused more heavily on the U.S. experience, especially 'These arguments are legend. Some influential examples of proponents of this view, however, include: Branson (1986) , Branson and Love (1988) , Brinner (1985) , dine (1986) , Krugman and Baldwin (1987) , Marris (1985) , Meyer (1986) , Peterson (1987) and Solomon (1985) . 1 during the period of the rise in the dollar.
2 While less widely discussed, this alternative hypothesis recently has been put forward by former Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Voicker in his book with Toyoo Cyohten: "I may be old-fashioned about this, but I have never been able to shake the feeling that a strong currency is generally a good thing and that it is typically a sign of vigor and strength and competitiveness" (1992 p. xv).
This article focuses on some European evidence, especially from the period when the dollar fell (1985 to 1990) , or when non-U.S. currencies appreciated.
Specifically it addresses whether European industries were "deindustrialized" when the dollar fell and European currencies appreciated. It concludes that the European evidence is also consistent with the view that a rise in the external value of a country's currency reflects an improvement in the performance of the country's industry or in its competitiveness.
Thus European countries gained competitiveness vis-a-vis the United States when the U.S. dollar fell and
European currencies appreciated, and they had lost it earlier when the dollar rose.
I. The Rise and Fall in the U.S. Dollar: Is the European Experience Comnarable?
Since the initiating factor giving rise to the "deindustrialization" hypothesis was the rise in the value of the dollar, a review of this experience is necessary for determining whether the experience in Europe is comparable.
Chart 1 shows the movements in the trade-weighted nominal and real exchange rates 2 The hypothesis is developed in several papers, including Tatom (1985 Tatom ( , 1986a Tatom ( , 1986b Tatom ( , 1987 Tatom ( , and 1988 . Lawrence (1983 and 1984) was among the first to cast doubt on the U.S. deindustrialization hypothesis. Click and 1-lutchinson (1990) argue that the rise in the value of the dollar in 1980-85 was linked to fiscal stimulus that could have raised the value of the dollar and stimulated output and employment in the U.S. traded-goods sector. Movements in the value of the dollar imply opposite movements in non-dollar currencies.
Thus, if a rise in the dollar deindustrializes the United States, the reversal of this movement should deindustrialize U.S. trading partners.
Whether this hypothesis is relevant for Europe depends on the extent to which movements in the value of the dollar are mirrored in European currencies. The hypothesis that there is an inverse linkage between a country's exchange rate and its industrial performance treats exchange rate movements as exogenous. When a country's currency rises (falls) in value, or the exchange rate rises (falls), domestic prices of imported goods fall and foreign prices of domestic exports rise. As a result, domestic consumers switch from local, import-competing goods to foreign suppliers, and foreigners switch from imports 4 The relatively larger rise in the value of the German mark against the other 11 appreciating European nations has been referred to as the German dominance hypothesis. In this view, a major shift against or in favor of the dollar vis a vis EMS countries affects the mark most of all. The focus on the dollar in accounting for EMS country movements is especially important in the l980s according to one of the hypotheses explained below. The German dominance hypothesis is explained by Giavassi and Giovannini (1989) .
to their own import-competing sector. The appreciating-currency country loses production for export and its import-competing sector shrinks, so the traded goods sector contracts. At the same time, the traded goods sector abroad will expand; the demand for its import-competing sector rises, as well as for its exports. This reflects the symmetry of the argument, of course, because these countries have depreciating currencies. According to this hypothesis, referred For example, a country's net exports of a product will fall, despite an increase in domestic production, if its own consumption rises more. A simple redistribution of world income can result in consumption changes that reduce world trade, and which reduce trade most in a country that is gaining income.
The latter's consumption of traded goods could rise relatively more than its production, so that its net exports fall or its net imports rise. Similarly, a redistribution of world resources and production can result in a decline in a country's net exports, perhaps even in its share of trade, despite an increase in the country's absolute output and its share of world production.
Real exchange rate measures are also unreliable indicators of competitiveness. Such measures frequently rely on consumer price measures, which are not representative of traded goods. Belassa (1961 Belassa ( , 1964 The alternative view of the exchange rate-competitiveness linkage focuses on influences that lower (raise) the.relative cost of a country's traded goods output, raising (lowering) the rate of return to capital in this sector, and attracting a net capital inflow into the country. In this case, the rise in the country's exchange rate reflects its increased competitiveness.' A sufficient condition for this result is the operation of purchasing power parity, so that a decline in cost in one country (due to a positive productivity or negative resource price shock, for example) requires that foreign producers' currency decline in value to maintain international competitiveness. 7
In the context of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, policies that boost productivity or capacity output in a country raise the value of its currency. Such changes in productivity also are associated with changes in relative rates of return to investment, so that capital flows reinforce the appreciation of the currency of the country which initially boosted the rate of return to capital. In this view, movements in the exchange rate reflect 6 Since, in this view and generally in economic theory, both the exchange rate and competitiveness are jointly determined endogenous variables, any correlation is conceivable depending upon the internal and external shocks affecting the economy. See Frenkel and Razin (1992), for example. This is the simplest refutation of the deindustrialization hypothesis. Piggott, Rutledge and Willett (1985) provide a discussion of a related problem involving the treatment of the exchange rate as an exogenous variable. Their analysis concerns the link between the exchange rate and the prices where the currency's value is inversely related to future domestic inflation, but the exchange rate might also be viewed as the cause of a rise in domestic prices.
7 Frenkel and Mussa (1985) provide a summary of the state of research on the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP). At least in the short run, it does not hold usually. Note that the PPP assumption above is a sufficient condition used for exposition only. The focus below is on real shocks for which naive tests of PPP would be expected to fail, especially in the short run. movements in competitiveness in the same direction, instead of acting as the agent for an inverse movement in competitiveness.
Economic policy has a major influence on competitiveness and the exchange rate. Attempts to boost productivity through increased investment, for example, typically involve new incentives to invest or anti-inflationary monetary policies aimed at reducing the cost of capital and raising the private rate of return to saving. To the extent that such efforts are expected to be successful, the value of the country's currency will rise. This positive linkage is also central to exchange rate policy in countries that manage their exchange rate.
Currency depreciation typically reflects a willingness to ratify a monetary policy that has been and/or is expected to be more inflationary than a country's trading partners. Winckler (1991) develops the case for signaling policy changes using exchange rate changes. See also Hochreiter and Winckler (1991) for an application to Austria.
The emphasis in such discussions is typically on monetary policy, but the analysis can also apply to fiscal policy, where supply-side effects on productivity can be more direct.
to shorter-lived assets, allowing expensing for some short-lived capital goods and substantially shortening the depreciation lives of most capital goods.
9 As a result of such changes, one would expect that U.S. investment would rise, boosting U.S. labor productivity and output. At the same time, the higher cost of capital abroad would be expected to retard foreign investment and productivity and output growth. World investment would be channeled by both U.S. and foreign investors toward the U.S. and away from foreign markets.
Dissatisfaction with the excesses of U.S. investment, especially in long-lived structures and very short-lived assets, as well as with the rise in the value of the dollar itself and with the trade deficit, led U.S. policymakers, in the first instance, to reverse these fiscal incentives and also to accelerate monetary growth. Monetary growth accelerated in early 1985, just after policy discussions of proposed fiscal actions also had begun. The fiscal actions adopted in the 1986 tax reform act included repeal of the investment tax credit and substantial lengthening in depreciation lives. Despite a reduction in the marginal income tax rates, taxes on capital income rose, boosting the cost of capital sharply.'°For example, corporate tax accruals, net of the Federal 9 These tax changes are discussed in Ott (1984) . The 1981 and 1986 tax changes and their effects on international capital flows are also discussed in Sinn (1988) and Mutti and Grubert (1988) . Koester and Kormendi (1989) provide evidence from 63 countries supporting the hypothesis that marginal tax rates on income have a negative influence on economic growth. Their marginal tax rate measures do not include adjustments for some tax changes that affect the marginal cost of capital and, therefore, investment, like changing depreciation and tax credit rules.
'°The maximum combined marginal tax rate on corporate income realized through reinvested earnings rose from 56.8 percent under the 1981 tax law to 59.1 percent under the 1986 tax reform; the former consisted of a 20 percent capital gains tax rate and a 46 percent corporate tax rate, and the latter consisted of a 39 percent corporate rate and a 33 percent personal income or capital gains tax rate.
For corporate capital income realized through dividends, the maximum tax rate fell from 73 percent in 1981 to 59.1 percent in 1986. The weighted average maximum marginal tax rate (assuming 50 percent of corporate earnings are As a result, the pattern of exchange rates, investment, productivity and output were expected to reverse, according to this view.
In particular, these changes were expected to raise the U.S. cost of capital and reduce the U.S. rate of return to capital, lower U.S. investment by domestic and foreign investors, and lower the cost of capital abroad. The changing pattern of investment could be expected to lower U.S. productivity and output growth and to raise these measures abroad, while lowering the value of the dollar or raising the value of foreign currencies. Thus, a decline in the value of the dollar was expected to boost European competitiveness, rather than deindustrializing Europe, as the conventional view might suggest. distributed as dividends) fell from 64.9 percent in 1981 to 59.1 percent. Thus, the corporate income tax base would have had to effectively rise by only 9 percent for the maximum tax on corporate capital income to have been raised. This base rose substantially more than this, however, due to the end of the investment tax credit and lengthened depreciation allowances.
Virtually all of these changes were concentrated in 5 manufacturing industries: electrical and transportation equipment, nonelectrical machinery, primary metals and apparel, according to Tatom (1988 The deindustrialization hypothesis also incorrectly interpreted the source of the dollar's strength. Proponents of the hypothesis typically cite the rise in the U.S. budget deficit as the source of interest rate increases which induced the rise in the dollar, rather than incentives to reallocate world capital. 12 tt See Tatom (1986a Tatom ( , 1986b Tatom ( , 1987 Tatom ( , 1988 . Tatom (l986a and 1988) show that there is a positive and statistically significant leading relationship between an increase (decrease) in the trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar and subsequent (3 quarters) increases (decreases) in U.S. manufacturing output, given cyclical influences on such output. This leading relationship is consistent with forward-looking foreign exchange markets which anticipate movements in productivity or competitiveness.
t2 The hypothesis that a rise in foreign demand for dollars to buy assets in Contrary to the deindustrialization hypothesis, there are only two periods in Table 2 when the budget deficit and the value of the dollar moved in the same direction. Moreover, in each of these instances, U.S. interest rates moved in the opposite direction, contrary to the transmission mechanism hypothesized in their view. The movements in the table are for the three-month Treasury bill rate, but other short-term rates, and a real rate constructed by computing the so in domestic currency. Since this currency bought substantially fewer dollars, foreign investment in the U.S. did not grow much faster than U.S. income from 1980 to 1985. The source of the dollar appreciation in international transactions is discussed below. The more relevant measure of competitiveness is the share of world output. States had the lowest rate of price increase shown.
In the 1980-85 period, inflation improved in all of the countries shown, but it improved least in the United States. As a result, the U.S. rate of export price increase ranked seventh in 1985-90, rather than first, as in 1980-85. The smaller decline in percent in 1990, which is a slightly larger improvement than in the United States. Interpreting movements in European unemployment rates as purely cyclical is questionable, however. For example, the 1980-85 rise in the unemployment rate from 6.1 percent in 1980 has been interpreted as largely a rise in the natural rate. Thus, cyclical movements from 1980 to 1985 and from 1985 to 1990 are likely to be quite similar in the U.S. and in Europe.
15 With fixed exchange rates, a positive productivity shock would be expected to lower domestic and world prices with money growth rising where the productivity shock originated and falling elsewhere.
With flexible exchange rates, these price pressures are allowed to show through to the exchange rates and less to foreign prices and relative money stocks. U.S. inflation in the late l980s, or larger decline in Europe, is consistent with the relative improvement in competitiveness in Europe; both of these changes reflect, presumably, the alterations in monetary and tax policies noted above.
While inflation (Table 4 ) and manufacturing growth rate comparisons (Table 3) The estimates all include a time trend (t) because the levels of some measures (1nLM and the logarithm of U.S. manufacturing output) have significant trends even though they are not trend stationary, while others (1nLXT and 1nLXF) have mixed results with the tests suggesting that they are either characterized as having trend stationary growth rates, 1(2), or that they are stationary, 1(0); unit roots are rejected for each of the latter specifications, but the trend is statistically significant in the growth rate test equations.' 7 Finally, adding OECD measures or European measures was "The test below was not conducted using the real exchange rate because the sample period is much shorter (beginning in 1972) for this series.
The two exchange rate measures are highly correlated, however, at least for the period since 1971.
'
7 According to standard Dickey-Fuller tests, all the other variables are 1(1) except for the European unemployment rate which is 1(2). Since the latter hypothesis relates to international changes in investment, it is useful to look at this pattern as well. Table 5 shows simple percentage changes in gross fixed capital formation for the U.S. and 11 European countries 18 The same test was performed for U.S. manufacturing output. In this case, only the U.S. real GOP and unemployment rate (in addition to the trend and 1nTWEX) enter a statistically significant (5 percent level) cointegrating vector. In this case, 1nTWEX has a significant positive coefficient, again supporting the supply-side hypothesis and decisively rejecting the deindustrialization hypothesis. The coefficient is 0.043 (t = 3.65) and output and the unemployment rate have their expected positive and negative coefficients, respectively. Finally, the evidence in Table 3 can be used to more systematically assess the exchange rate-competitiveness linkage. Table 6 provides evidence on the correlation coefficients for the growth rates of manufacturing output shown in Table 3 and the movements in the nominal and real exchange rates in Table 1 
